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Abstract: Using an event study methodology, this paper examines how European firms have 
been affected by the announcement of the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) of 
the ECB. Firms with an investment-grade rating benefit relatively more as evidenced by higher 
share prices and lower CDS spreads, which reflects that the ECB is restricted to purchasing 
investment-grade corporate debt securities. The gains to shareholders relative to the total gains of 
shareholders and debtholders are negatively related to firm leverage, consistent with the 
existence of debt overhang. Firms more heavily impacted by the pandemic benefit relatively little 
from the PEPP, which could reflect that the business models of some of these firms are heavily 
damaged by the pandemic. Monetary policy in the form of the PEPP and national fiscal 
responses to the pandemic are shown to be complements in the sense that a strong pre-PEPP 
fiscal response enhances the potential for the PEPP to positively affect equity and debt 
valuations. 
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The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a sharp reduction of economic activity, which 
negatively affected the revenues, liquidity and potentially solvency of many firms. In response to 
this crisis, the European Central Bank announced the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program 
(PEPP) on March 18, 2020. The PEPP earmarks €750 billion for the purchase of government and 
private debt securities until the end of 2020 without a preset allocation rule.1 PEPP-eligible 
private debt instruments are investment-grade, issued by non-bank companies incorporated in the 
euro zone, and dominated in euros.2 The combined monetary and fiscal policy response to the 
COVID-19 crisis around the world, including corporate QE, appears to have led to a quick 
overall recovery of equity prices.  
This paper uses an event study methodology to investigate which European firms benefited 
more from the PEPP as evidenced by a more positive share price response and a greater decline 
in the CDS spread, signaling lower expected credit losses on a firm’s debts. We find a more 
positive abnormal stock return for investment-grade firms, consistent with the PEPP targeting 
investment-grade debt securities. At the same time, the CDS spread of investment-grade firms 
declined relatively more after the PEPP announcement, suggesting improved expectations of 
solvency for such firms. 
The benefits of the PEPP, however, extend beyond strictly PEPP-eligible firms. In particular, 
European firms with a non-investment grade rating also experienced a more positive abnormal 
stock (relative to firms without a credit rating) as evidence of a spillover of the PEPP to credit 
                                                 
1 The Federal Reserve announced the establishment of two new facilities to acquire corporate bonds in the primary 
and secondary market on March 23, 2020. These are the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF) and the 
Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF).  





markets that are not directly affected, although the stock price response for non-investment grade 
firms is weaker than for investment-grade firms. In addition, the finding that investment grade 
firms experienced relatively large excess stock returns holds up if we restrict the sample to 
European firms that are not incorporated or headquartered in a euro area country, indicating 
spillovers of the PEPP to non-euro European countries. 
While on average both shareholders and debtholders gain from the PEPP announcement, the 
division of the overall gains between shareholders and debtholders is found to reflect the pre-
announcement financial strength of the firm. In particular, firms that are closer to bankruptcy, as 
proxied by a higher leverage ratio and a higher book-to-market value of equity, experience 
relatively smaller gains for shareholders and relatively bigger gains for debtholders.  
Specifically, the abnormal stock return is negatively related to the book-to-market ratio, while 
the CDS spread change is negatively related to both the leverage and book-to-market ratios.  
To make the gains to shareholders and debtholders more directly comparable, we also 
consider the change in the market value of equity, and the change in the market value of debt as 
implicit in the CDS change using the approach of Veronesi and Zingales (2010). Using these 
additional valuation variables, we find similar results. In particular, the share of shareholder 
gains in total shareholder and debtholder gains is negatively related to both the leverage and 
book-to-market ratios. The relatively smaller gains for shareholders of more leveraged firms 
following the PEPP announcement is consistent with the existence of debt overhang in the case 
of highly leveraged firms. 
We also examine whether the PEPP announcement affected firms differently depending 
on whether they are highly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that firms in highly 




abnormal stock return and a relatively smaller decline in the CDS spread. These results could 
reflect that highly affected firms have restricted access to credit markets even after the PEPP 
announcement, and hence can benefit relatively less from the generally lower borrower costs 
wrought by the PEPP. Alternatively, the business models of highly affected firms could be more 
permanently impaired, which suggests that there are fewer profitable investment opportunities 
for these firms that need to be financed regardless of the PEPP. 
Finally, we consider how the impact of the PEPP announcement on equity and debt 
valuations depends on the strength of pre-PEPP national fiscal responses to the pandemic. Firms 
generally benefit from pandemic-related fiscal measures, either directly as in the case of, say, 
wage subsidies, or indirectly to the extent that fiscal measures serve to avert a deep recession 
with a concomitant fall in demand for the firm’s output. Thus, fiscal measures should move firms 
farther away from insolvency, which potentially influences how the PEPP affect firms. We find 
that firms that are investment grade and rely relatively more on bond finance experience higher 
abnormal stock returns, especially if located in countries with stronger fiscal responses. At the 
same time, the CDS spread declines more with a firm’s dependence on bond finance if it is 
located in a country with a stronger fiscal response to the pandemic. These results suggest that 
the monetary and fiscal policy responses to the pandemic are complements in the sense that a 
strong pre-PEPP fiscal response enhances the potential for the PEPP to positively affect equity 
and debt valuations. 
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to consider how corporate QE affects individual-
firm share prices. In addition, by also considering CDS spreads, we can shed light on how the 
differential gains to shareholders and debtholders from corporate QE depend on firm 




accrue to debtholders in the case of highly leveraged firms is analogous to the classical modeling 
by Myers (1977), which shows that a larger share of the gains of additional investment accrues to 
debtholders in case of highly leveraged firms. The implied debt overhang can give rise to 
underinvestment (see also Hennessy, 2004, and Diamond and He, 2014). Debt overhang was 
blamed for a slow recovery from the previous financial crisis, as it caused many firms to display 
weak subsequent investment (see Kalemli-Ozcan, Laeven, and Moreno, 2020, for empirical 
evidence of a debt overhang effect on corporate investment for the European case). Monetary 
policy in the form of the PEPP, by providing relatively larger valuation gains to the debtholders 
of highly indebted firms, can be expected to ameliorate underinvestment incentives at these 
firms. 
This paper contributes to a literature that examines the impact of monetary policy on equity 
prices.3 Most of this literature predates QE and hence examines changes in conventional 
monetary policy. Using an event study methodology, Thorbecke (1997) finds a significantly 
negative relation between policy-related changes in the federal funds rate and the return on the 
DJIA stock index. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) similarly find a positive response of the overall 
stock market to unexpected federal funds rate changes relative to Federal funds futures. Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2004) consider how the share prices of individual firms react to surprise 
monetary policy changes on FOMC meeting days, finding that firms with low cash flow-to-
income ratios, small size, high price-earnings ratios and high Tobin’s q are affected significantly 
more by monetary policy changes.4 The observed heterogeneity in the share price response to 
monetary policy is attributed to how monetary policy changes differentially affect firms’ access 
                                                 
3 Rigabon and Sack (2003) document that monetary policy reacts to the stock market as well, with the Fed being 
more likely to tighten monetary policy after a fall in the stock market. 
4 Cieslak, Morse and Vissing-Jorgensen (2019) find evidence that communication by the FED about monetary 




to credit given informational asymmetries. Using a VAR methodology, Maio (2013) similarly 
finds a heterogeneous stock market response to monetary policy as based on variables such as 
size and the market-to-book ratio.  In this paper, we consider how the reaction of equity prices to 
corporate QE in the form of the PEPP differentially depends on firms’ financing and exposure to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, controlling for firm characteristics that have been found to affect the 
share price response to monetary policy in previous research.  
Studies that examine the financial market effects of unconventional monetary policy changes 
primarily focus on bond markets. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), for instance, 
find that the announcement of QE1 in the US significantly reduced yields on US Treasury debt, 
US agency debt and on MBS. Additional studies, surveyed by Kuttner (2018), similarly find that 
QE announcements in the US significantly reduced yields in the US bond market. Analogously, 
Dell’Ariccia, Rabanal and Sandri (2018) survey studies on the impact of QE in the Euro Area, 
Japan and the United Kingdom, also documenting reductions in bond yields following QE 
announcements.5 In a recent paper, Hartley and Rebucci (2020) find that 24 COVID-19 QE 
announcements by 21 global central banks caused a 1-day reduction in the yield on 10-year 
government bonds of -0.14% on average.  
The ECB first purchased corporate bonds as part of its Corporate Sector Purchase Program 
(CSPP) that was announced in March 2016, with eligibility criteria similar to the PEPP.6 Several 
papers have examined the effects of the CSPP on euro zone credit markets. Todorov (2020) finds 
that bond yields dropped on average by 30 basis points after the CSPP announcement, while bid-
ask spreads narrowed as evidence of improved liquidity. In addition, firms issued 25% more in 
                                                 
5 Arrata, Nguen, Rahmouni-Rousseau and Vari (2020) find that the ECB’s purchasing of public bonds in the euro 
zone has made these assets relatively scarce, causing a decline in the repo rate involving these bonds. 




QE-eligible debt after the CSPP announcement compared to other types of debt. Gross-
Rueschkamp, Steffen, and Streitz (2019) study the transmission channel of CSPP to firms’ 
capital structures via the banking sector. Lower bond yields after the CPSS announcement cause 
firms that can issue eligible debt to substitute additional bond finance for bank finance. This 
enables previously constrained banks to increase their lending to profitable private firms. Betz 
and De Santis (2019), Ertan, Kleymenova, and Tuijn (2018), and Arce, Gimeno, and 
Mayordomo (2017) similarly find evidence of a bank credit reallocation effect of the CSPP 
towards firms that cannot issue CSPP-eligible debt. Rischen and Theissen (2019) further find 
that the CSPP has tended to reduce the initial underpricing of newly issued bonds in the euro 
area bond market. Our paper adds to the literature on the CSPP by examining how a similar 
program, i.e. the PEPP, affects euro zone equity prices at the time of the COVID-19 crisis.  
There are several channels by which QE can affect equity prices. QE can directly affect 
equity prices through a revaluation of the firms’ assets and liabilities triggered by lower interest 
rates. Furthermore, a firm with higher net worth, and in particular higher asset values, following 
QE can more easily obtain additional credit (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1989), which could 
indirectly contribute to a higher share price.7 QE can further have macroeconomic effects with 
implications for share prices. To illustrate, Gambetti and Musso (2017) provide evidence that QE 
in the euro zone has had a significant upward effect on real GPD, which could have had a 
beneficial effect on share prices. In related papers, Luck and Zimmermann (2020) provide 
evidence of an employment effect of QE in the US, while Giambona, Matta, Peydro and Wang 
                                                 
7 Additionally, higher equity prices in the case of banks imply a higher market value of the bank’s capital, which can 





(2020) find an investment effect of QE also in the US, consistent with improved prospects for 
firms stemming from  QE.  
This paper’s focus on the impact of the PEPP on equity prices and CDS spreads is warranted, 
as it provides new insights into QE as a monetary tool to improve financial conditions for firms 
at a time of economic crisis. A main finding is that the PEPP raises share prices and reduces 
CDS spreads for firms with an investment grade rating, as the ECB is restricted to purchasing 
investment grade debt. Importantly, however, the benefits of the PEPP are shown to extend 
towards non-investment grade firms, and firms that are not incorporated or headquartered in the 
euro area, as evidence of policy spillovers. Going beyond prior papers, this paper examines the 
division of the gains from the PEPP between shareholders and debtholders, finding that 
debtholders gain relatively more if the firm is more leveraged, consistent with the existence of 
debt overhang. The paper has two main findings directly related to the COVID-19 crisis. First, 
firms that are more heavily impacted by the pandemic benefit relatively little from the PEPP, 
suggesting that monetary policy has only a limited potential to offset a large negative shock to a 
firm’s earnings capacity. Second, the PEPP is a complement to national fiscal responses to the 
pandemic in the sense that a strong pre-PEPP fiscal response enhances the potential for the PEPP 
to raise a firm’s equity and debt valuations. In the remainder, section 2 discusses the data and the 
methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results, and section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data  
We obtain data on publicly traded firms headquartered in Europe from Thomson Reuters. We 




SIC codes between 6000 and 6999, 4900 and 4949, and 8000 and above). We select firms for 
which price information on common shares is available, but discard firms with illiquid shares 
that display zero daily stock returns more than trading 90 days in the year before January 24, 
2020 when the first coronavirus case was reported in Europe. We also exclude firms with a share 
price that dropped to zero during this one year window. Furthermore, we only retain ultimate 
parent firms (by abandoning firms with a name that differs from the ultimate parent company 
name), and firms for which we can obtain accounting data. 
A first dependent variable is abnormal return, which is the excess stock return on March 19, 
2020 when European financial markets could first react to the PEPP announcement made the 
prior evening (see Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions and data sources). 
Abnormal return is calculated as the difference between the actual stock return and the predicted 
stock return, derived from an estimated relation between the firm’s stock return and the return on 
the euro denominated MSCI World Index during the year from January 24, 2019 to January 23, 
2020 (this is the year prior to the discovery of the first COVID-19 infection in Europe on January 
24, 2020).8 The mean abnormal return was 0.56% for 2011 European firms from 32 countries 
(see Table 1; see Table A2 in the Appendix for the number of firms per country). This positive 
abnormal return followed a week of negative average abnormal returns for European firms (see 
Figure 1), perhaps in part driven by market disappointments over the absence of a PEPP-like 
intervention by the ECB  before. On March 19, 2020, the average absolute stock return was 1.7% 
(see Figure 2), given a positive return on the MSCI World Index of 0.04% on that day. 
 As an additional dependent variable, we consider the change in a firm’s CDS spread on 
March 19, 2020. The CDS spread is the cost of ensuring against default, and hence a lower CDS 
                                                 





spread suggests lower expected credit losses for debt security holders. We consider CDS spreads 
for five-year contracts written on senior bonds.9 We drop illiquid CDS contracts, for which the 
quoted CDS spread was the same as on the day before for more than 90 days in the year 
beginning on January 24, 2019. If available, we select euro denominated contracts, and otherwise 
we take dollar or Swiss franc denominated contracts (106 of the 111 CDS contracts in our 
sample are euro denominated). The mean CDS spread decreased by 4.5 basis points on March 
19.  
 Higher share prices and lower CDS spreads provide prima facie evidence that the PEPP 
had beneficial effects in the face of the COVID-19 shock which jeopardized corporate liquidity 
and solvency. In particular, higher share prices could in part reflect a greater borrowing capacity, 
either because asset prices improved or because future borrowing costs declined. At the same 
time, a lower CDS spreads hints at a lower probability of bankruptcy for the firm, which entails 
lower expected bankruptcy costs for the firm itself and for its various stakeholders. In addition, a 
lower CDS spread suggests that the firm faces a stronger incentive to invest, as there is less 
potential for additional investment to primarily increase the valuation of debt on account of a 
debt overhang problem.  
 Arguably, monetary policy at a time of crisis is especially effective if it reduces 
expectations of bankruptcy and debt overhang, rather than if it mainly creates additional 
shareholder wealth. Thus, it is interesting to consider to what extent and for what firms the PEPP 
reduced the CDS spread rather than engendered an abnormal return for shareholders. To be able 
to compare CDS and share price changes more directly, we examine the changes in the values of 
the firm’s overall equity and of its overall debt as implied by the observed share price and CDS 
                                                 
9 In addition, we select CDS spreads with an MM14 restructuring clause (Modified-Modified Restructuring for data 




changes, both scaled by the book value of assets at the end of 2019. In particular, dMVE/Book 
assets is the change in the market value of equity on March 19, 2020 (calculated as the change in 
the share price times the number of shares outstanding), divided by the book value of assets at 
the end of 2019. The mean of dMVE/Book assets is 2.94% for a sample of 2211 observations.  
Analogously, dMVD/Book assets is the estimated change in the value of the firm’s 
overall debt implicit in the CDS change on March 19, 2020, divided by the book value of assets 
at the end of 2019. We follow the methodology of Veronesi and Zingales (2010) to calculate the 
change in the value of debt as the change in the cost of insuring the debt against default implicit 
in the CDS spread change. At any moment, the cost of ensuring the firm’s debt against default in 
the CDS market is given by 
 I =  ∑
CDS(t)
10000
D(t)Q(t)Z(t),Tt=0         (1) 
where CDS(t) is the cost of ensuring debt in year t, D(t) is the amount of debt that will not have 
matured by year t, Q(t) is the probability of not defaulting up to year t, Z(t) is the t-year risk-free 
discount factor, and T is the maximum maturity of debt. The CDS spread in (1) is divided by 
10000, as the CDS spread is normally expressed in basis points. The change in the market value 
of debt at the time of the PEPP announcement is then given by: 










t=0 ],                         (2) 
where the subscripts 0 and 1 denote CDS(t) and Q(t) observed before and after the PEPP 
announcement, respectively. To implement equation 2, we assume a constant risk free rate of 2% 
so that Z(t) = exp(−0.02t). Also, we assume a constant instantaneous probability of default and 
we set the debt recovery rate at 0.6 so that Q(t) = e
−t
CDS(t)
10000(1−δ) (see Veronesi and Zingales, 2010, 




(close the average mean remaining maturity of bonds and loans of 2.31 and 4.27 years for the 
firms in our sample, calculated from Capital IQ data), and we assume that firms repay the 
outstanding debts in equal annual payments, i.e. they repay a third of their debts each year. Using 
these assumptions, we calculate the mean dMVD/Book assets to be 5.95 basis points for a 
sample of 111 firms. 
 We also consider the increase in the market value of equity relative to the sum of the 
increases in the market values of equity and debt, i.e. dMVE/(dMVE + dMVD) in case both 
dMVE and dMVD are positive, which is the case for 66 firms. The mean of dMVE/(dMVE + 
dMVD) is 0.879, i.e. on average 87.9% of the total valuation gains accrue to shareholders. 
Alternatively, we compute dMVE/(dMVE + dMVD) conditional on the sum of dMVE and 
dMVD being positive, yielding 84 observations with a mean of 0.812. 
 We relate the various dependent variables reflecting share price and CDS spread changes 
to a range of independent variables that capture (i) the likely relative impact of the PEPP on the 
firm as indicated by the firm’s credit rating and reliance on bond finance, (ii) other firm 
characteristics that potentially proxy for credit constraints and debt overhang that could be 
alleviated by the PEPP,  (iii) whether a firm belongs to an industry that is highly affected by 
COVID-19, and, finally, (iv) the strength of pertinent national fiscal policy measures to counter 
the pandemic that potentially affect the implications of monetary policy for the firm. 
 The PEPP is restricted to purchasing corporate debt securities that are investment grade, 
which suggests that corporate issuers with an investment grade rating are more directly affected 
by the PEPP.  To test this, we construct the Investment grade dummy variable, which signals 
that the firm had a long term issuer credit rating of at least BBB-/Baa3 issued by either Moody’s, 




create this variable. Analogously, the Non-investment grade dummy variable refers to firms that 
had an issuer rating below BBB-/Baa3 on March 17, 2020. In our sample, 9.9% of firms had an 
investment grade rating, while 4.6% of had a non-investment grade rating. The remaining firms 
had no issuer rating. 
 Firms that rely more heavily on bond finance are potentially more strongly affected by 
the PEPP, as the PEPP is restricted to purchasing marketable debt securities. To represent a 
firm’s bond issuance, Bonds/assets is calculated as the ratio of the sum of the principal amounts 
of all outstanding bonds as of the most recent reporting date in 2019 available in  S&P’s Capital 
IQ (most commonly, end of Q2 or Q4 in 2019) divided by total assets. Bonds are defined to 
include commercial paper and notes. Assets for the same reporting date as bonds are obtained 
from Compustat. We matched data from Capital IQ and Compustat with data from Eikon based 
on ISIN security numbers. In our sample, firms finance on average 5.75% of assets using bonds. 
The implications of monetary policy for a firm depend, among other things, on whether it 
serves to alleviate credit constraints and debt overhang. Some firms no doubt already were 
subject to credit constraints and debt overhang before the COVID-19 crisis, while the occurrence 
of this crisis can only have aggravated these problems for many firms, even if to different 
extents. To proxy for potential pre-existing credit constraints and debt overhang, we consider a 
range of firm-level variables similarly to Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) and Maio (2014), 
measured as of the end of 2019 and thus predating the COVID-19 crisis,.  
Among these, Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to assets. Highly leveraged firms 
potentially experience greater credit constraints and debt overhang that could be alleviated by the 
PEPP. The sample mean of Leverage in our sample is 53.1%. Log assets is the natural logarithm 




income before extraordinary items divided by assets, with a mean of -2.91%. More profitable 
firms are less likely to experience credit constraints and debt overhang. Book-to-market is the 
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity with a mean of 0.650. Firms with a 
higher book-to-market could face fewer credit constraints if a high book-to-market reflects lower 
growth opportunities and investment needs, but it could alternatively signal debt overhang 
resulting from depressed asset valuation.  
In some specifications, we include several additional variables that potentially are 
indicative of credit constraints. Among these, Cash-to-price ratio is the cash-flow per share 
divided by the share price with a mean of 0.083, and Earnings to-price is net income per share 
divided by the share price with a mean of -0.0259. Firms with a lower cash flow or net income 
per share relative to the share price could be more subject to credit constraints. Cash/assets is 
cash balances divided by assets with a mean of 0.157. A greater cash/assets ratio could be a sign 
of lower credit constraints as the firm can fund itself for a while, but alternatively it could signal 
greater credit constraints as firms could accumulate greater cash balances exactly because they 
know that they are credit constraint  (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004). Finally, 
redeployability is a measure of asset redeployability based on Kim and Kung (2017), computed 
as the value-weighted average of asset-level redeployability indices across a firm’s business 
segments using market capitalizations in each industry-year as weights. Firms with more 
redeployable assets are less likely to experience credit constraints. The alleviation of credit 
constraints and debt overhang by the PEPP could result in higher share prices and lower CDS 
spreads. In addition, relatively smaller gains for shareholders compared to debtholders could be a 




The COVID-19 crisis has differentially impacted the earning power of firms, and as a 
corollary any worsening of credit constraints and debt overhang that they may experience. This 
implies that firms that are highly affected by the pandemic could see their share prices, CDS 
spreads and other derived valuation variables differentially affected by the PEPP. A priori, it is 
uncertain whether, say, the share prices of highly affected firms should rise or fall relatively 
more on account of the PEPP. On the one hand, highly affected firms could be essentially 
insolvent and headed for bankruptcy anyway, in which case monetary policy would be impotent 
to improve the firm’s prospects and hence raise its share price. On the other hand, highly affected 
firms that are not certain to go bankrupt could see their credit constraints go down relatively 
more, giving rise to a relatively large share price increase. We capture a firm’s exposure to 
COVID-19 by the Affected industry dummy, which indicates the following industries that were 
particularly affected by the pandemic according to the OECD (2020): Entertainment; 
Construction materials; Automobiles and trucks; Aircraft; Shipbuilding, railroad equipment; 
Personal services; Business services; Transportation; Wholesale; Retail; Restaurants, hotels, 
motels. This list of industries is also used by Fahlenbrach et al. (2020) in their study of the share 
price reactions of US firms to news of the US fiscal policy response to the pandemic on March 
24, 2020.10 
Firms are not only helped by monetary policy in the form of the PEPP, but also by fiscal 
policies at the national level. Firms located in countries with strong fiscal responses to the 
COVID-19 crisis arguably were already less distressed at the time the PEPP was announced. 
This suggests that the PEPP has more potential to raise the share price, and less potential to 
                                                 
10 These authors analyze how the share price reactions of all firms and separately of highly affected firms to the 
COVID-19 shock and the subsequent fiscal policy news depend on measures of financial flexibility, showing that 
firms with less financial flexibility experience worse stock returns until March 23 and benefit more from the news 




lower the CDS spread, of firms located in countries with stronger pre-PEPP fiscal responses to 
the COVID-19 crisis. To test this, we include the Fiscal response/GDP variable, which is the 
total amount of pandemic-related economic stimulus spending in a firm’s country of residence 
announced up to March 17, 2020 divided by the country’s GDP. Fiscal response/GDP has a 
mean of 0.044. These data are obtained from Hale et al. (2020). 
 2.2 Methodology 
 Using an event study methodology, we estimate specifications of the following general 
form: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘 +
               𝛼𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘          (3)  
where  𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 is a valuation change variable, such as the excess stock return or the change in the 
CDS premium, for firm i in industry j and country k on the event day of March 19, 2020. 𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑘 is a 
set of firm financing variables (Investment grade, Non-investment grade, and Bonds/assets) that 
reasonably imply greater benefits for a firm from the PEPP. Thus, the estimated coefficients 𝛽1 
are expected to be positive and negative, if 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 stands for the excess stock return and the change 
in the CDS premium, respectively. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘 is a set of additional firm-level variables (at a minimum, 
Leverage, Log of assets, ROA, and Book-to-market) that potentially affect the benefits of the 
PEPP for the firm. 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  indicates whether a firm is in an industry that is 
affected relatively strongly by the COVID-19 crisis. A priori, is it not clear whether firms in 
more affected industries stand to gain more or less from the PEPP. Hence, the estimated 
coefficient 𝛽3 could be of either sign in, say, an excess stock return regression.  𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑘 ∗
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘 is a set of interactions of firm-level financing variables and the fiscal 




benefit from the PEPP, which would be consistent with the estimated coefficients 𝛽4 being 
positive in an excess stock return regression, and negative in a CDS premium change regression. 
The specification further includes a set of country fixed effects 𝛼𝑘 to control for any country-
level news on the event day, such as on the national development of the pandemic, that could 
affect the valuation variables. The uninteracted fiscal response variable is subsumed in these 
country fixed effects. The errors are clustered at the country level to accommodate any 
commonality at this level. 
 
3. Empirical results  
This section presents empirical evidence on the impact of monetary policy in the form of 
the PEPP on European firms by examining equity and debt market reactions to the PEPP 
announcement. The analysis takes into account that European firms were different before the 
COVID-19 crisis, and also were affected differently by this crisis. To make the former 
distinction, we first present ‘baseline’ results taking into account variables that potentially 
explain the financial market response to a corporate bond-buying program such as the PEPP, and 
in particular the firm’s credit rating and extent of bond finance, but excluding variables related to 
the COVID-19 crisis. Subsequently, we additionally include information on which industries 
were affected most by COVID-19 and on the strength of countries’ fiscal responses to the 
pandemic. 
Table 2 shows regressions of the abnormal stock return on March 19, 2020 (when the 
stock market could first react to the PEPP announcement made in the evening of the previous 
day) for the full sample of European firms. In regression 1, the issuer-level Investment grade 




that can issue investment grade debt benefited relatively more from the PEPP announcement. 
ROA is estimated with a negative and significant coefficient, as less profitable firms potentially 
gain more from the PEPP due to a relaxation of financial constraints. Regression 2 additionally 
includes the Non-investment grade dummy. In this regression, the Investment grade and Non-
investment grade dummy variables receive coefficients of 0.0232 and 0.0137 that are significant 
at 1% and 10%, respectively. Thus, the PEPP benefits firms with a non-investment grade rating 
as well (relative to firms without a credit rating), although less strongly than firms with an 
investment-grade rating. Instead of these dummy variables, regression 3 includes the 
Bonds/assets to reflect the extent to which a firm relies on bond finance, which is estimated to be 
insignificant. In this regression, Book-to-market is negative and significant, perhaps because 
firms with a high Book-to-market are closer to bankruptcy so that accommodative monetary 
policy has less potential to benefit shareholders rather than debtholders. Regression 4 includes 
the financing variables included in regressions 2 and 3 as well as the interaction Bonds/assets * 
Investment grade. In this regression, Investment grade is estimated to be positive and significant 
in regression 2. In addition, Bonds/assets is negative and significant, and Bonds/assets * 
Investment grade is positive and significant. This suggests that firms with an investment grade 
rating benefit more from the PEPP, if they rely relatively more on bond finance.  
 Starting from regressions 1-4, regressions 5-8 include several additional independent 
variables that proxy for financing constraints that are potentially alleviated by the PEPP (the 
additional variables are Cash-to-price, Earnings-to-price, Cash/assets and Redeployability). In 
these regressions, Cash/assets receives positive and significant coefficients, as high cash 
balances could reflect financial constraints that are mitigated by the PEPP. In these regressions, 




of Table 2 provide evidence of greater abnormal returns for bond-issuing firms, and especially 
firms with an investment grade rating, which makes sense as the PEPP targets investment-grade 
debt instruments. 
 Firms incorporated in the euro area are potentially PEPP eligible and hence could be 
directly affected by PEPP purchases, while other European firms could see their access to 
finance and credit terms affected more indirectly through PEPP spillovers in bond markets. To 
estimate the effects of potential PEPP eligibility and alternatively PEPP spillovers on excess 
returns, we next split the overall sample of European firms into firms incorporated and not 
incorporated in a euro area country. In addition, we also consider a sample split into firms that 
are headquartered and not headquartered in a euro area country, with potentially different PEPP 
effects as firms that are headquartered in a euro area country are more likely to borrow in the 
euro area capital market that is more directly affected by PEPP purchases.  
We first consider excess returns for firms that are either incorporated or headquartered in 
the euro area. Specifically, regressions 1-4 of Panel A of Table 3 provide estimates of 
regressions 1-4 of Table 2 for the sample of firms that are incorporated in a euro area country, 
while regressions 5-8 of this panel provide analogous estimates for firms that are headquartered 
in the euro area.11 The investment grade dummy is estimated to be positive but insignificant in 
regressions 1 and 2, unlike in regressions 1-2 of Table 2. The interaction of Bonds/assets with 
Investment grade in regression 4, however, is positive and significant as in the corresponding 
regression in Table 2, providing some evidence that investors discriminate among euro area 
incorporated firms on the basis of the investment grade criterion for PEPP eligibility. For the 
sample of euro area headquartered firms, the investment grade dummy is positive and significant 
                                                 
11 There are 911 and 921 firms that are identified as incorporated and headquartered in the euro area, respectively, of 




in regressions 5 and 6, while the interaction Bonds/assets * Investment grade is positive and 
significant in regression 8. Taken together, the evidence of Panel A suggests that investors more 
clearly discriminate between investment grade firms and other firms among euro area 
headquartered firms compared to euro area incorporated firms. This could reflect that euro area 
headquartered firms as a group are in a better position to benefit from the effect of the PEPP on 
bond markets given their substantive nexus to the euro area, or alternatively that investors act on 
better known information about a firm’s country of headquarter location than its country of 
incorporation.  
Panel B of Table 3 provides the results of analogous excess return regressions for the 
groups of non-euro area incorporated and non-euro area headquartered firms. The investment 
grade dummy is positive and significant in regressions 1, 2 and 4 for the sample of non-euro area 
incorporated firms, and also in regressions 5, 6 and 8 for the sample of non-euro area 
headquartered firms. These results provide strong evidence of PEPP spillovers to European firms 
that are either not incorporated or not headquartered in a euro area country. In fact, the evidence 
of Table 3 suggests that investors discriminate more strongly among firms that are investment 
grade vs other firms among groups of firms that are not directly targeted by the PEPP, i.e. firms 
that are either not incorporated or headquartered in the euro area. Conceivably, this reflects 
investors’ surprise that the ECB announced the PEPP, which has an obvious potential for 
spillover effects via capital markets, instead of other possible monetary policy measures that 
would have had less potential for spillovers to firms with a weaker link to the euro area. 
We can also estimate excess return regressions at the country level to determine any 
PEPP effects in individual euro area and non-euro area countries. Specifically, Table 4 reports 




headquartered in the UK, which is a main non-euro area country with a well-developed bond 
market (reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity). The investment grade dummy 
is positive and significant in columns 1 and 2 for UK incorporated firms, while it is positive in 
columns 3 and 4 (and significant in column 4) for firms that are headquartered in the UK, 
indicating strong evidence of PEPP spillovers to UK firms.  
More broadly, we estimated regression 1 of Table 2 for countries with more than 25 
incorporated firms, and alternatively more than 25 headquartered firms. This yields a significant 
positive effect of the investment grade dummy on the excess returns of firms incorporated in 
Belgium (euro area country) and the UK (non-euro area country), and insignificant effects for 
firms incorporated in other countries. In addition, there is a significant positive effect of the 
investment grade dummy on the excess returns of firms headquartered in Belgium and Greece 
(euro area countries) and Russia (non-euro area country), and insignificant effects for firms that 
are headquartered in other countries.12 Thus, there is evidence of PEPP effects on excess stock 
returns in individual euro as well as non-euro area countries. 
Table 5 presents regressions of the change in the CDS spread that are analogous to Table 
2. These regressions are based on a much smaller sample of observations (for instance, 111 
observations in regression 1), compared to the excess returns regressions of Table 2. In 
regression 1, the Investment grade dummy is estimated to be negative and significant, suggesting 
lower expected credit losses on securities issued by investment-grade firms after the PEPP 
announcement, consistent with increased demand for such securities by the ECB through the 
PEPP. In this regression, the estimated coefficient for Leverage is negative and significant. This 
                                                 





could reflect that highly leveraged firms are closer to bankruptcy, so that the potential for 
monetary policy in the form of the PEPP to reduce expected credit losses is greater. Book-to-
market is also estimated to be negative and significant, which could similarly reflect that firms 
with a high Book-to-market are closer to bankruptcy and subject to a debt overhang, which 
entails that accommodative monetary policy is relatively potent in reducing expected credit 
losses rather than in raising share prices (consistent with regressions 3-4 and 7-8 in Table 2). In 
regression 2, the Non-investment grade dummy is insignificant, while in regression 3 
Bonds/assets is insignificant. In regression 4, all the financing related variables turn out to be 
insignificant.  In regressions 5-8, Cash/assets is positive and significant, perhaps because bond 
investors see a smaller potential for the PEPP to reduce expected credit losses for firms with high 
cash/assets ratios, as they think that firms with large cash balances can use this cash to pay off 
debts. Otherwise, regressions 5-8 are very similar to regressions 1-4.  
Overall, Table 5 shows evidence that investment grade firms see expected credit losses 
on their debts decline relatively more on account of the PEPP, as the PEPP increases demand for 
such securities. In addition, firms that are closer to bankruptcy and thus are likely to suffer more 
from debt overhang, as indicated by higher leverage and book-to-market values, are shown to 
experience relatively larger declines in CDS spreads, suggesting larger reductions in expected 
credit losses for bond investors.  
Analogously to Table 3, we estimated CDS premium change regressions separately for 
firms that are or are not incorporated or headquartered in the euro area. The results, as shown in 
Table A3 in the Appendix, provide some limited evidence of a relatively large decline in the 




regressions 1 and 5 of Panel A) or alternatively not incorporated in the euro area (in regression 4 
of Panel B), based on rather small samples of firms.13 
On average, both shareholders and debtholders benefit from the PEPP as indicated by the 
negative average abnormal return and the negative average CDS change. To make the gains that 
accrue to shareholders and debtholders comparable, we next examine how the PEPP has affected 
the valuations of equity and debt separately and relatively to each other, as indicated by 
dMVE/Book assets, dMVD/Book assets and two versions of dMVE/(dMVE + dMVD), 
conditional on whether dMVE and dMVD are both or in the aggregate positive. Table 6 shows 
the results of regressions of the four pertinent variables on the same set of variables as in 
regression 1 of Table 2 plus the firm’s market Beta which is the coefficient of a regression of the 
daily log stock return on the daily log return of the MSCI World index for the period from 
January 24, 2019 to January 23, 2020. In regressions 1 and 2, the Investment grade dummy is 
estimated with positive and significant coefficients of 0.0219 and 0.00121, indicating that both 
shareholders and debtholders of investment grade firms benefit relatively more from the PEPP 
announcement (consistent with the results of Tables 2 and 5). In regressions 3 and 4, the 
estimated coefficients are negative at -0.146 and -0.213 and significant, suggesting that for 
investment grade firms, a relatively smaller share of the total gains accrues to shareholders.  
The leverage and book-to-market variables are both negative and significant in regression 
1, positive and significant in regression 2, and negative and significant in regression 3. Thus, 
firms that appear to be closer to bankruptcy and putatively suffer more from debt overhang (with 
                                                 
13 In robustness checks, we estimated Tables 2 and 4 for alternative event windows, for instance computing the 
excess stock return and the CDS premium change during the three day window of March 18-20. In these robustness 
checks, we continue to find that investment grade firms experienced relatively large excess stock returns. The 
finding that the CDS premium for such firms declined relatively much, however, is not robust to changing the event 
window. In another robustness check, we dropped firms with an ROA of less than -0.5, yielding very similar results 




higher leverage or book-to market) experience smaller shareholder gains, larger debtholder 
gains, and correspondingly smaller shareholder gains relative to total shareholder and debtholder 
gains. ROA is negative and significant in regression 1, indicating smaller shareholder gains for 
more profitable firms, but ROA is insignificant in regressions 2 and 3. Beta is positive and 
significant in regression 1, suggesting that shareholders of riskier firms gain relatively more from 
the PEPP, while Beta is insignificant in regressions 2 and 3. 
Next, we consider whether the PEPP announcement affected firms differently depending 
on whether they are in industries that have been highly affected by the COVID-19 crisis. The 
PEPP lowers prospective borrowing costs for firms, but there are several reasons to expect that 
highly affected firms are less able to take advantage of the generally lower borrowing costs. 
First, highly affected firms could be closer to insolvency and thus unable to access credit markets 
even after the PEPP announcement. Second, the business models of highly affected firms may be 
permanently impaired, which suggests that there are fewer profitable investment opportunities 
for these firms that need to be financed. Third, the relatively large decline in the value of the 
assets of highly affected firms implies that these firms could have become subject to debt 
overhang, which reduces the incentives of these firms to invest as a substantial share of the 
benefits of additional investment would accrue to debtholders. For these reasons, the absolute 
gains of the PEPP announcement for shareholders as well as debtholders could be relatively 
small for highly affected firms.14 In relative terms, debtholders of highly affected firms are 
expected to gain relatively more on account of the more severe debt overhang. 
                                                 
14 Going the other way, however, lower prospective borrowing costs could make a costly bankruptcy less likely, 
especially in the case of highly affected firms. This stands to benefit both shareholders and debtholders ex ante, i.e. 
before a bankruptcy occurs, through lower borrowing costs, although bankruptcy costs only accrue to debtholders ex 





Table 7 shows the results of regressions of equity and debt valuation variables that 
include the Affected industry variable as a proxy for how strongly a firm has been affected by 
the pandemic. Specifically, regression 1 includes the Affected industry variable in the abnormal 
return regression 1 of Table 2, yielding a negative and significant coefficient for this variable. 
This result is consistent with relatively smaller gains for shareholders of highly affected firms on 
account of the PEPP. Analogously, regression 2 includes the Affected industry variable in the 
CDS change regression 1 of Table 5. This yields a positive and significant coefficient of 2.438 
for the Affected industry variable, suggesting that also debtholders of highly affected firms gain 
relatively less from the PEPP announcement. Next, we include Affected industry in the 
regressions of dMVE/Book assets, dMVD/Book assets and the two versions of dMVE/(dMVE + 
dMVD) of Table 6, with the results reported as regressions 3-6 in Table 7. The coefficients are 
negative and significant in regressions 3 and 4, consistent with smaller gains for both 
shareholders and debtholders of highly affected firms. Affected industry receives negative 
coefficients in regressions 5 and 6 consistent with a relatively small share of the total gains 
accruing to shareholders in the case of highly affected firms, but these coefficients are 
insignificant.   
Finally, we consider how the impact of the PEPP announcement on equity and debt 
valuations depends on the strength of national fiscal responses to the pandemic as summarized 
by the Fiscal response/GDP variable. Firms tend to benefit from fiscal measures, either directly 
as in the case of, say, wage subsidies, or indirectly to the extent that fiscal measures serve to 
avert a deep recession with a concomitant fall in demand for the firm’s output. Thus, fiscal 
measures tend to move firms farther away from insolvency, which has implications for how the 




easily access credit markets to take advantage of lower borrowing costs, which suggests a 
stronger impact of the PEPP on equity and debt valuations in countries with stronger fiscal 
measures. Similarly, firms in countries with strong fiscal measures may have a greater incentive 
to invest, both on account of a shallower recession and less debt overhang, which also increases 
the potential for the PEPP to increase equity and debt valuations.15  
Table 8 provides empirical evidence on the interaction effect of the PEPP and pandemic-
related fiscal policies on the abnormal stock return and the CDS change. In particular, to 
examine the impact of this interaction on abnormal returns, we include interactions of Fiscal 
policy/GDP with pertinent financing variables in regressions 1-4 of Table 2, with the results 
reported as regressions 1-4 of Table 8. Thus, regression 1 includes the interaction Fiscal 
policy/GDP * Investment grade, which is estimated to be positive and significant, indicating a 
greater abnormal return following the PEPP announcement for investment-grade firms in 
countries with stronger fiscal measures. Similarly, Fiscal policy/GDP * Investment grade and 
Fiscal policy/GDP * Non-investment grade are both estimated to be positive and significant in 
regression 2. In regression 3, Fiscal response/GDP * Bonds/assets is positive and significant, 
indicating  that more heavily bond-financed firms gain more from the PEPP if located in 
countries with stronger fiscal measures. The interaction Fiscal response/GDP * Bonds/assets * 
Investment grade has a positive and significant coefficient in regression 4, hinting at greater 
benefits of the PEPP for investment-grade firms that are more heavily bond-financed and located 
in countries that took more extensive fiscal measures. 
Analogously, we include interactions of Fiscal policy/GDP with pertinent finance 
variables in the CDS change regressions 1-4 of Table 5, with the results reported as regressions 
                                                 
15 To the contrary, strong fiscal measures could reduce the potential for the PEPP to lower the probability of costly 




5-8 in Table 8. In regression 7, the interaction Fiscal policy/GDP * Bonds/assets is negative and 
significant, indicating that debtholders benefit more from the PEPP if firms are more dependent 
on bond finance. In regressions 5 and 7-8, the interactions of Fiscal response/GDP with included 
financing variables are insignificant. Overall, Table 8 provides evidence of a positive effect of 
the interaction of monetary policy in the form of the PEPP and fiscal policies on equity and debt 





The PEPP is a key element of the European policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
PEPP enables the ECB to spend an additional €750 billion to purchase debt securities including 
corporate bonds. By increasing demand for corporate bonds, the ECB makes it easier for 
corporations to issue additional bonds, thereby improving firms’ chances of surviving the 
pandemic. 
Using an event study methodology, this paper finds that investment-grade firms benefit 
especially from the PEPP as evidenced by higher share prices and lower CDS spreads, which is 
likely to reflect that the ECB is restricted to purchasing investment-grade debt securities. 
However, non-investment grade firms benefit from the PEPP as well relative to firms without a 
credit rating, due to spillovers of anticipated ECB purchases to the non-investment grade bond 
market. Firms in euro as well as non-euro area countries were positively affected by the PEPP, 
providing evidence of PEPP spillovers to non-euro area countries. 
While on average both shareholders and debtholders gain from the PEPP announcement, the 
division of the overall gains between shareholders and debtholders is found to reflect the pre-




shareholder and debtholder gains is negatively related to both the leverage and book-to-market 
ratios. The relatively smaller gains for shareholders of more thinly capitalized firms (indicated by 
either the leverage ratio or the book-to-market ratio) following the PEPP announcement is 
consistent with the existence of debt overhang, and a potential effect of monetary policy to 
ameliorate debt overhang at a time of economic crisis. 
We find that firms in highly affected industries benefit relatively less from the PEPP, as 
indicated by a relatively lower abnormal stock return and a relatively smaller decline in the CDS 
spread. These results could reflect that highly affected firms have restricted access to credit 
markets even after the PEPP announcement, and hence can benefit relatively little from the 
generally lower borrower costs wrought by the PEPP. Alternatively, the business models of 
highly affected firms could be more permanently impaired, which suggests that there are fewer 
profitable investment opportunities for these firms that need to be financed. 
Finally, we find that the impact of the PEPP on a firm’s equity and debt valuations 
depends on the strength of pre-PEPP national fiscal responses to the pandemic. In particular, 
firms that are investment grade and rely relatively more on bond finance experience higher 
abnormal stock returns, especially if located in countries with stronger fiscal responses. At the 
same time, the CDS spread declines more with a firm’s dependence on bond finance if it is 
located in a country with a stronger fiscal response to the pandemic. These results suggest that 
the monetary and fiscal policy responses to the pandemic are complements in the sense that a 
strong pre-PEPP fiscal response enhances the potential for the PEPP to positively affect equity 
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Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal stock returns around the announcement of the PEPP 
 
This graph shows the unweighted average of the cumulative abnormal stock returns of publicly traded European 
firms, excluding non-financial firms, utilities, not for profit and governmental firms, in a two-week window centered 
around the time of the PEPP announcement in the evening of March 18, 2020. Only ultimate parent companies are 
included. Abnormal stock returns are calculated as the difference between the predicted and the actual returns for a 







Figure 2: Cumulative stock returns around the announcement of the PEPP 
 
This graph shows the unweighted average of the cumulative stock returns of  publicly traded European firms, 
excluding non-financial firms, utilities, not for profit and governmental firms, in a two-week window centered 








Figure 3: CDS spread changes around the announcement of the PEPP 
 
This graph shows the unweighted average of the cumulative CDS spread changes of publicly traded European firms, 
excluding non-financial firms, utilities, not for profit and governmental firms, in a two-week window centered 









Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics. Abnormal return is the abnormal stock return observed on March 19, 2020. 
CDS change is the change in the CDS spread observed on March 19, 2020. dMVE/Book assets is the change in the 
market value of equity on March 19, 2020 divided by the book value of assets at the end of 2019. dMVD/Book 
assets is the change in the market value of debt on March 19, 2020 divided by the book value of assets at the end of 
2019. dMVE/(dMVE + dMVD), dMVE > 0, dMVD > 0 is the change in the market value of equity on March 19, 
2020 divided by the sum of the changes in the market values of equity and debt on March 19, 2020, conditional on 
both of these being positive. dMVE/(dMVE + dMVD), dMVE + dMVD > 0 is the change in the market value of 
equity on March 19, 2020 divided by the sum of the changes in the market values of equity and debt on March 19, 
2020, conditional on the sum of these being positive. Investment grade is a dummy variable indicating a long term, 
domestic or foreign, issuer credit rating of at least BBB-/Baa3 issued by either Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. Non-
investment grade is a dummy variable indicating a long term, domestic or foreign, issuer credit rating lower than 
BBB-/Baa3 issued by either Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. Bonds/assets is the sum of the principal amounts of 
outstanding bonds divided by the book value of assets at the last reporting date in 2019. Leverage is liabilities 
divided by assets at the end of 2019. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of assets at the end of 2019. ROA is net 
income before extraordinary items divided by assets at the end of 2019. Book-to-market is the book value of equity 
divided by the market value of equity at the end of 2019. Cash-to-price is cash from operating activities in 2019 
divided by the market value of equity at the end of 2019. Earnings-to-price is net income before extraordinary items 
in 2019 divided by the market value of equity at the end of 2019. Cash/assets is the sum of cash, cash and 
equivalents and short-term investments divided by assets at the end of 2019. Redeployability is a measure of asset 
redeployability at the four-digit SIC industry level as of 2015 from Kim and Kung (2017). Beta is the coefficient of 
a regression of the daily log stock return on the daily log return of the MSCI World index. Affected industry is a 
dummy variable indicating industries that are relatively affected by the COVID-19 crisis. Fiscal response/GDP is the 
total amount of economic stimulus spending announced in a country until March 17, 2020 divided by GDP. 
 
    Observations Mean SD Min Max   
Abnormal return  2211 0.00555 0.0626 -0.157 0.150  
CDS change  111 -4.508 7.874 -26.68 39.25  
dMVE/Book assets  2211 0.0294 0.115 -0.671 0.510  
dMVD/Book assets  111 0.000595 0.00114 -0.00653 0.00393  
dMVE/(dMVE + dMVD), 
dMVE > 0, dMVD > 0 
 63 0.879 0.203 0.109 1.000  
dMVE/(dMVE + dMVD), 
dMVE + dMVD > 0 
 84 0.812 0.555 -3.336 1.196  
Investment grade  2211 0.0991 0.299 0 1  
Non-investment grade  2211 0.0461 0.210 0 1  
Bonds/assets  1873 0.0575 0.102 0 0.444  
Leverage  2211 0.531 0.215 0.0323 0.964  
Log assets  2211 19.62 2.516 14.33 26.44  
ROA  2211 -0.0291 0.224 -1.203 0.304  
Book-to-market  2211 0.650 0.705 0.0322 5.194  
Cash-to-price  2195 0.0831 0.203 -0.694 1.048  
Earnings-to-price  2211 -0.0259 0.225 -1.309 0.358  
Cash/assets  2208 0.157 0.166 0.000189 0.903  
Redeployability  2211 0.387 0.104 0.0603 0.600  
Beta  2211 0.616 0.503 -2.194 2.810  
Affected industry  2211 0.288 0.453 0 1  




Table 2: Abnormal stock returns and the PEPP 
 
The dependent variable is the abnormal return observed on March 19, 2020. Investment grade (Non-investment grade) is a dummy variable indicating a long 
term, domestic or foreign, issuer credit rating of at least (lower than) BBB-/Baa3 issued by either Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. Leverage is liabilities divided by assets 
at the end of 2019. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of assets at the end of 2019. ROA is net income before extraordinary items divided by assets at the end 
of 2019. Book-to-market is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the end of 2019. Bonds/assets is the sum of the principal amounts of 
outstanding bonds divided by the book value of assets at the last reporting date in 2019. Cash-to-price is cash from operating activities in 2019 divided by the 
market value of equity at the end of 2019. Earnings-to-price is net income before extraordinary items in 2019 divided by the market value of equity at the end of 
2019. Cash/assets is the sum of cash, cash and equivalents and short-term investments divided by assets at the end of 2019. Redeployability is a measure of asset 
redeployability at the four-digit SIC industry level as of 2015 from Kim and Kung (2017). Regressions include country fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Investment grade  0.0206*** 0.0232***  0.0134** 0.0207*** 0.0232***  0.0131*  
  (0.00464) (0.00515)  (0.00641) (0.00462) (0.00505)  (0.00682)  
Leverage  -0.0133 -0.0145 -0.0159 -0.0117 -0.00383 -0.00494 -0.00672 -0.00291  
  (0.00959) (0.00889) (0.0103) (0.00997) (0.00590) (0.00557) (0.00896) (0.00831)  
Log assets  -0.000924 -0.00134 0.000463 -0.00161 -0.000796 -0.00120 0.000741 -0.00130  
  (0.000950) (0.000936) (0.000951) (0.00106) (0.00103) (0.00100) (0.00106) (0.00110)  
ROA  -0.0225*** -0.0211*** -0.0342*** -0.0288*** -0.0215*** -0.0204*** -0.0348*** -0.0289***  
  (0.00639) (0.00604) (0.00818) (0.00740) (0.00505) (0.00494) (0.00912) (0.00901)  
Book-to-market  -0.00277 -0.00274 -0.00625*** -0.00487** -0.00121 -0.00107 -0.00427*** -0.00302*  
  (0.00202) (0.00196) (0.00157) (0.00181) (0.00144) (0.00142) (0.00153) (0.00158)  
Non-investment grade   0.0137*  0.00811  0.0131**  0.00747  
   (0.00681)  (0.00662)  (0.00643)  (0.00673)  
Bonds/assets    -0.00475 -0.0374*   -0.00516 -0.0376*  
    (0.0195) (0.0187)   (0.0194) (0.0189)  
Bonds/assets * Investment grade     0.0864*    0.0862*  
     (0.0443)    (0.0475)  
Cash-to-price      -0.000355 -0.00133 0.000131 0.000904  
      (0.0104) (0.00984) (0.00853) (0.00907)  




      (0.0109) (0.0105) (0.0124) (0.0127)  
Cash/assets      0.0281*** 0.0273*** 0.0363*** 0.0362***  
      (0.00635) (0.00674) (0.00532) (0.00576)  
Redeployability      -0.00496 -0.00535 0.000360 -0.000421  
            (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0156) (0.0158)   
Observations  2211 2211 1873 1873 2192 2192 1864 1864  
Adjusted R-squared  0.045 0.047 0.043 0.055 0.048 0.049 0.048 0.059  






Table 3: Abnormal stock returns and the PEPP in euro area and non-euro area countries 
 
The dependent variable is the abnormal return observed on March 19, 2020. Investment grade (Non-investment grade) is a dummy variable indicating a long 
term, domestic or foreign, issuer credit rating of at least (lower than) BBB-/Baa3 issued by either Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. Leverage is liabilities divided by assets 
at the end of 2019. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of assets at the end of 2019. ROA is net income before extraordinary items divided by assets at the end 
of 2019. Book-to-market is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the end of 2019. Bonds/assets is the sum of the principal amounts of 
outstanding bonds divided by the book value of assets at the last reporting date in 2019. Regressions 1 to 4 (5 to 8) in Panel A include firms that are incorporated 
(headquartered) in the euro area. Regressions 1 to 4 (5 to 8) in Panel B include firms that are not incorporated (headquartered) in the euro area. Regressions 
include country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
 Panel A   Incorporated in euro area   Headquartered in euro area   
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Investment grade  0.00929 0.0124  -0.00475  0.0134* 0.0160*  -0.00142  
  (0.00654) (0.00769)  (0.00362)  (0.00693) (0.00835)  (0.00239)  
Leverage  -0.0151* -0.0167* -0.0236** -0.0200**  -0.0153* -0.0165* -0.0236** -0.0197*  
  (0.00744) (0.00797) (0.00948) (0.00939)  (0.00865) (0.00926) (0.00999) (0.00984)  
Log assets  0.000735 0.000231 0.00140 -0.00000153  0.000430 0.0000161 0.00144* -0.000125  
  (0.000784) (0.000872) (0.000832) (0.00116)  (0.000776) (0.000891) (0.000777) (0.00112)  
ROA  -0.0415** -0.0399** -0.0375* -0.0353  -0.0370** -0.0357** -0.0380* -0.0351  
  (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0208) (0.0211)  (0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0208) (0.0212)  
Book-to-market  -0.00360 -0.00364 -0.00845*** -0.00775***  -0.00468** -0.00458** -0.00807*** -0.00733***  
  (0.00296) (0.00286) (0.00230) (0.00236)  (0.00206) (0.00202) (0.00232) (0.00240)  
Non-investment grade   0.0131  0.00757   0.0111  0.00742  
   (0.00925)  (0.00665)   (0.00879)  (0.00656)  
Bonds/assets    -0.0128 -0.0443    -0.0154 -0.0456*  
    (0.0312) (0.0262)    (0.0305) (0.0257)  
Bonds/assets * Investment grade     0.131***     0.122***  
     (0.0395)     (0.0362)  
Observations   911 911 802 802   921 921 802 802   
Adjusted R-squared  0.032 0.034 0.036 0.045  0.039 0.040 0.035 0.043  






 Panel B   Not incorporated in euro area   Not headquartered in euro area   
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Investment grade  0.0297*** 0.0317***  0.0310**  0.0263*** 0.0288***  0.0260*  
  (0.00432) (0.00441)  (0.0114)  (0.00394) (0.00391)  (0.0129)  
Leverage  -0.0132 -0.0143 -0.0101 -0.00505  -0.0119 -0.0133 -0.0105 -0.00609  
  (0.0136) (0.0124) (0.0161) (0.0156)  (0.0141) (0.0126) (0.0155) (0.0147)  
Log assets  -0.00212 -0.00241* -0.000325 -0.00289*  -0.00196 -0.00233* -0.000434 -0.00284*  
  (0.00132) (0.00122) (0.00148) (0.00139)  (0.00132) (0.00123) (0.00146) (0.00139)  
ROA  -0.0154** -0.0143** -0.0323*** -0.0257***  -0.0167** -0.0153** -0.0319*** -0.0256***  
  (0.00656) (0.00579) (0.00987) (0.00730)  (0.00656) (0.00562) (0.00943) (0.00713)  
Book-to-market  -0.00189 -0.00186 -0.00500** -0.00316  -0.00150 -0.00155 -0.00515** -0.00337  
  (0.00205) (0.00204) (0.00184) (0.00231)  (0.00262) (0.00252) (0.00184) (0.00229)  
Non-investment grade   0.0124  0.00816   0.0153  0.00857  
   (0.0101)  (0.0120)   (0.0109)  (0.0120)  
Bonds/assets    0.000423 -0.0348    0.00427 -0.0319  
    (0.0205) (0.0272)    (0.0207) (0.0271)  
Bonds/assets * Investment grade     0.0354     0.0517  
     (0.0798)     (0.0910)  
Observations   1297 1297 1069 1069   1290 1290 1071 1071   
Adjusted R-squared  0.047 0.047 0.043 0.057  0.043 0.044 0.045 0.057  





Table 4: Abnormal stock returns and the PEPP in the United Kingdom 
 
The dependent variable is the abnormal return observed on March 19, 2020. Investment grade (Non-investment grade) is a dummy variable indicating a long 
term, domestic or foreign, issuer credit rating of at least (lower than) BBB-/Baa3 issued by either Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. Leverage is liabilities divided by assets 
at the end of 2019. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of assets at the end of 2019. ROA is net income before extraordinary items divided by assets at the end 
of 2019. Book-to-market is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the end of 2019. Regressions 1 and 2 (3 and 4) include firms that are 
incorporated (headquartered) in the United Kingdom. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
    Incorporated in the UK   Headquartered in the UK   
    (1) (2)   (3) (4)   
Investment grade  0.0288** 0.0328**  0.0203 0.0255*  
 
 (0.0139) (0.0149)  (0.0138) (0.0148)  
Leverage  0.0206 0.0171  0.0321 0.0268  
 
 (0.0231) (0.0237)  (0.0226) (0.0229)  
Log assets  -0.00185 -0.00252  -0.00107 -0.00191  
 
 (0.00306) (0.00319)  (0.00295) (0.00310)  
ROA  -0.0377 -0.0345  -0.0385 -0.0347  
 
 (0.0308) (0.0313)  (0.0310) (0.0314)  
Book-to-market  0.000842 0.000799  0.00377 0.00336  
 
 (0.00679) (0.00690)  (0.00614) (0.00622)  
Non-investment grade   0.0153   0.0203  
 
  (0.0193)   (0.0186)  
Constant  0.0163 0.0301  -0.00423 0.0137  
 
 (0.0574) (0.0606)  (0.0556) (0.0590)  
Observations   363 363   390 390   





Table 5: CDS spread changes and the PEPP 
 
The dependent variable is the change in the CDS spread observed on March 19, 2020. Investment grade (Non-investment grade) is a dummy variable indicating a 
long term, domestic or foreign, issuer credit rating of at least (lower than) BBB-/Baa3 issued by either Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. Leverage is liabilities divided by 
assets at the end of 2019. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of assets at the end of 2019. ROA is net income before extraordinary items divided by assets at 
the end of 2019. Book-to-market is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the end of 2019. Bonds/assets is the sum of the principal 
amounts of outstanding bonds divided by the book value of assets at the last reporting date in 2019. Cash-to-price is cash from operating activities in 2019 
divided by the market value of equity at the end of 2019. Earnings-to-price is net income before extraordinary items in 2019 divided by the market value of 
equity at the end of 2019. Cash/assets is the sum of cash, cash and equivalents and short-term investments divided by assets at the end of 2019. Redeployability is 
a measure of asset redeployability at the four-digit SIC industry level as of 2015 from Kim and Kung (2017). Regressions include country fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Investment grade  -7.971** -8.587**  -2.344 -8.941** -10.00**  -3.291  
  (3.146) (3.367)  (3.443) (3.000) (3.933)  (3.513)  
Leverage  -13.34** -13.25** -8.237 -12.63* -9.732* -9.626* -4.639 -7.495  
  (4.168) (4.105) (4.609) (5.876) (4.448) (4.523) (6.554) (4.960)  
Log assets  0.690 0.720 0.105 0.666 0.865 0.938 0.229 0.911  
  (0.667) (0.669) (0.573) (0.566) (0.701) (0.734) (0.664) (0.690)  
ROA  5.945 5.114 11.30 12.49 4.337 4.448 10.64 8.967  
  (9.943) (10.93) (9.374) (12.83) (17.97) (18.02) (23.36) (17.64)  
Book-to-market  -7.389*** -7.487*** -5.874*** -7.422*** -5.730** -5.784** -4.280 -5.408**  
  (1.723) (1.818) (1.602) (1.945) (2.156) (1.972) (3.440) (2.192)  
Non-investment grade   -1.561  -4.766  -2.657  -6.433  
   (5.117)  (5.967)  (4.003)  (6.431)  
Bonds/assets    -8.823 48.27   -9.099 54.76  
    (9.180) (56.25)   (8.121) (57.17)  
Bonds/assets * Investment 
grade 
    -59.18    -66.01  
     (53.72)    (57.46)  
Cash-to-price      -14.46 -14.64 -12.25 -18.05  
      (11.42) (11.38) (13.91) (13.48)  
Earnings-to-price      4.568 2.920 4.219 6.983  




Cash/assets      27.99** 28.31** 22.45* 27.81**  
      (10.47) (10.79) (11.28) (10.60)  
Redeployability      0.0565 1.211 2.137 1.311  
            (6.544) (5.967) (6.182) (6.928)   
Observations  111 111 108 108 111 111 108 108  
Adjusted R-squared  0.111 0.102 0.036 0.155 0.134 0.127 0.037 0.200  






Table 6: Change in the absolute and relative valuations of equity and debt and the PEPP 
 
The dependent variable in regression 1 is the change in the market value of equity on March 19, 2020 divided by the book value of assets at the end of 2019. The 
dependent variable in regression 2 is the change in the market value of debt on March 19, 2020 divided by the book value of assets at the end of 2019. The 
dependent variable in regression 3 is the change in the market value of equity on March 19, 2020 divided by the sums of the changes in the market values of 
equity and debt on March 19, 2020, conditional on both of these being positive. The dependent variable in regression 4 is the change in the market value of 
equity on March 19, 2020 divided by the sums of the changes in the market values of equity and debt on March 19, 2020, conditional on the sum of these being 
positive. Investment grade is a dummy variable indicating a long term, domestic or foreign, issuer credit rating of at least (lower than) BBB-/Baa3 issued by 
either Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. Leverage is liabilities divided by assets at the end of 2019. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of assets at the end of 2019. ROA 
is net income before extraordinary items divided by assets at the end of 2019. Book-to-market is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at 
the end of 2019. Beta is the coefficient of a regression of the daily log stock return on the daily log return of the MSCI World index. Regressions include country 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   









    
dMVE > 0, 
dMVD > 0 
dMVE + 
dMVD > 0  
Investment grade   0.0219*** 0.00121** -0.146*** -0.213**   
  (0.00718) (0.000527) (0.0241) (0.0742)  
Leverage  -0.0661** 0.00214*** -0.540*** -0.990**  
  (0.0247) (0.000579) (0.136) (0.330)  
Log assets  -0.00286 -0.000122 0.0213 -0.00812  
  (0.00203) (0.0000896) (0.0151) (0.0336)  
ROA  -0.0805*** -0.000760 -0.120 1.491  
  (0.0143) (0.00164) (0.251) (1.115)  
Book-to-market  -0.0239*** 0.00109*** -0.243*** -0.303***  
  (0.00503) (0.000267) (0.0641) (0.0695)  
Beta  0.0141** -0.000324 -0.0757 -0.122  
    (0.00563) (0.000319) (0.0503) (0.112)   
Observations  2211 111 63 84  
Adjusted R-squared  0.094 0.113 0.383 -0.015  





Table 7: The impact of the PEPP on highly affected firms 
 
In regression 1 the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return observed on March 19, 2020. In regression 2 the dependent variable is the change in the CDS 
spread observed on March 19, 2020. In regression 3 the dependent variable is the change in the market value of equity on March 19, 2020 divided by the book 
value of assets at the end of 2019. In regression 4 the dependent variable is the change in the market value of debt on March 19, 2020 divided the book value of 
assets at the end of 2019. In regression 5 the dependent variable is the change in the market value of equity on March 19, 2020 divided by the sum of the change 
in the market values of equity and debt on March 19, 2020, conditional on both of these being positive. In regression 6 the dependent variable is the change in the 
market value of equity on March 19, 2020 divided by the sum of the change in the market values of equity and debt on March 19, 2020, conditional on the sum 
of these being positive. Affected industry is a dummy variable indicating industries that are relatively affected by the COVID-19 crisis. Investment grade is a 
dummy variable indicating a long term, domestic or foreign, issuer credit rating of at least (lower than) BBB-/Baa3 issued by either Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. 
Leverage is liabilities divided by assets at the end of 2019. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of assets at the end of 2019. ROA is net income before 
extraordinary items divided by assets at the end of 2019. Book-to-market is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the end of 2019. 
Beta is the coefficient of a regression of the daily log stock return on the daily log return of the MSCI World index. Regressions include country fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   












      
dMVE > 0, 
dMVD > 0 
dMVE + 
dMVD > 0  
Affected industry   -0.00511** 2.438* -0.00816** -0.000362* -0.0280 -0.253   
  (0.00220) (1.311) (0.00357) (0.000163) (0.0619) (0.145)  
 Investment grade  0.0204*** -7.871** 0.0215*** 0.00119** -0.152*** -0.253***  
  (0.00451) (3.036) (0.00696) (0.000515) (0.0311) (0.0603)  
Leverage  -0.0110 -16.57*** -0.0625** 0.00265*** -0.517*** -0.695**  
  (0.0103) (3.003) (0.0252) (0.000361) (0.135) (0.292)  
Log assets  -0.000848 0.852 -0.00270 -0.000143 0.0216 -0.00905  
  (0.000934) (0.719) (0.00199) (0.0000951) (0.0154) (0.0363)  
ROA  -0.0221*** 3.543 -0.0799*** -0.000235 -0.0699 1.954  
  (0.00629) (9.186) (0.0142) (0.00151) (0.294) (1.270)  
Book-to-market  -0.00259 -8.429*** -0.0236*** 0.00124*** -0.234*** -0.214*  
  (0.00197) (1.241) (0.00497) (0.000218) (0.0510) (0.111)  
Beta    0.0137** -0.000251 -0.0672 -0.0513  




Observations  2211 111 2211 111 63 84  
Adjusted R-squared  0.046 0.120 0.095 0.123 0.374 0.012  






Table 8: The interaction of the PEPP and national fiscal responses to COVID-19 
 
In regressions 1 to 4 the dependent variable is the one-day abnormal return observed on March 19, 2020. In regressions 5 to 8 the dependent variable is the CDS 
spread change observed on March 19, 2020. Investment grade (Non-investment grade) is a dummy variable indicating a long term, domestic or foreign, issuer 
credit rating of at least (lower than) BBB-/Baa3 issued by either Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. Fiscal response/GDP is the total amount of economic stimulus spending 
announced in a country until March 17, 2020 divided by GDP. Bonds/assets is the sum of the principal amounts of outstanding bonds divided by the book value 
of assets at the last reporting date in 2019. Leverage is liabilities divided by assets at the end of 2019. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of assets at the end of 
2019. ROA is net income before extraordinary items divided by assets at the end of 2019. Book-to-market is the book value of equity divided by the market value 
of equity at the end of 2019. Regressions include country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 










CDS change CDS change CDS change CDS change 
Investment grade 0.0164*** 0.0184***  0.0180** -8.585* -9.842*  -5.792 
 (0.00539) (0.00570)  (0.00871) (3.905) (4.702)  (7.114) 
Fiscal response/GDP * Investment grade  0.0696* 0.0823**  -0.146** 14.00 21.12  -44.39 
 (0.0347) (0.0354)  (0.0582) (21.39) (24.76)  (54.71) 
Non-investment grade  0.00655  0.00218  -0.666  -11.65 
  (0.00868)  (0.00880)  (5.222)  (10.64) 
Fiscal response/GDP * Non-investment grade   0.133*  0.112*  -288.3  477.5 
  (0.0675)  (0.0652)  (392.7)  (635.4) 
Bonds/assets   -0.0242 -0.0358   -0.263 96.13 
   (0.0226) (0.0233)   (10.80) (79.29) 
Fiscal response/GDP * Bonds/assets   0.420*** -0.0702   -142.7* -5744.3 
   (0.144) (0.202)   (67.60) (5016.7) 
Fiscal response/GDP * Bonds/assets * Investment    
grade 
   1.310***    5636.3 
   (0.309)    (4993.7) 
Bonds/Assets * Investment grade     0.0277    -100.7 
    (0.0409)    (76.60) 
Leverage -0.0149 -0.0166* -0.0178* -0.0141 -13.23** -13.23** -7.539 -10.17* 
 (0.00962) (0.00865) (0.0102) (0.00958) (4.179) (4.176) (4.414) (4.565) 
Log assets -0.000787 -0.00119 0.000549 -0.00136 0.621 0.615 0.132 0.807 
 (0.000962) (0.000937) (0.000967) (0.00106) (0.640) (0.648) (0.596) (0.820) 
ROA -0.0226*** -0.0211*** -0.0344*** -0.0294*** 5.704 4.361 18.45 15.96 




Book-to-market -0.00287 -0.00293 -0.00645*** -0.00490** -7.355*** -7.356*** -6.145*** -7.144** 
  (0.00203) (0.00189) (0.00154) (0.00186) (1.740) (1.866) (1.500) (2.257) 
Observations 2182 2182 1859 1859 111 111 108 108 
Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.058 0.103 0.089 0.049 0.209 









Table A1: Description of variables 
 
Variable Description Source 
Abnormal return Excess stock return observed on March 19, 2020. It is calculated as the difference between the 
actual and predicted returns for a stock. Actual returns are calculated as the difference between 
the natural logarithms of the closing prices between March 19 and 18, 2020. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
CDS change Change of the CDS spread observed on March 19, 2020. Thomson Reuters Eikon 
dMVE/Book assets Change in the market value of equity on March 19, 2020 divided by the book value of assets at 
the end of 2019. Market value of equity is calculated as the sum of the market values of issued 
shares. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
dMVD/Book assets Change in the market value of debt on March 19, 2020 divided by the book value of assets at the 
end of 2019. The change in the market value of debt is calculated using CDS spreads on March 
18 and 19, 2020. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
dMVE/(dMVE + dMVD) 
dMVE > 0, dMVD > 0 
Change in the market value of equity on March 19, 2020 divided by the sum of the changes in the 
market values of equity and debt on March 19, 2020, conditional on both of these being positive. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
dMVE/(dMVE + dMVD) 
dMVE + dMVD > 0 
Change in the market value of equity on March 19, 2020 divided by the sum of the changes in the 
market values of equity and debt on March 19, 2020, conditional on the sum of these being 
positive. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Investment grade Dummy variable indicating a long term, domestic or foreign, issuer credit rating of at least BBB-
/Baa3 issued by either Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Non-investment grade Dummy variable indicating a long term, domestic or foreign, issuer credit rating lower than BBB-
/Baa3 issued by either Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Bonds/assets The sum of the principal amounts of outstanding bonds divided by the book value of assets at the 
last reporting date in 2019. Bonds include Commercial Paper, Bonds and Notes as reported in 
Capital IQ. 
S&P Capital IQ, 
Compustat 
Leverage Labilities divided by assets at the end of 2019. Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Log assets Natural logarithm of assets at the end of 2019. Thomson Reuters Eikon 
ROA Net income before extraordinary items divided by assets at the end of 2019. Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Book-to-market Book value of equity divided by market value of equity at the end of 2019. Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Cash-to-price Cash from operating activities in 2019 divided by the market value of equity at the end of 2019. Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Earnings-to-price Net income before extraordinary items in 2019 divided by the market value of equity at the end of 
2019. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Cash/assets The sum of cash, cash and equivalents and short-term investments divided by assets at the end of 
2019. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Redeployability A measure of asset redeployability at the four-digit SIC industry level as of 2015. The measure is 
computed as the value-weighted averages of asset-level redeployability indices across business 




segments for Compustat firms, using market capitalization of Compustat firms in each industry-
year as the weight. 
Beta The coefficient of a regression of the daily log stock return on the daily log return of the MSCI 
Europe index. 
Datastream 
Affected industry Dummy variable indicating the following Fama-French-49 industries: Entertainment; 
Construction materials; Automobiles and trucks; Aircraft; Shipbuilding, railroad equipment; 
Personal services; Business services; Transportation; Wholesale; Retail; Restaurants, hotels, 
motels. 
Fahlenbrach et al. (2020) 
Fiscal response/GDP The total amount of economic stimulus spending announced in a country until March 17, 2020 
divided by GDP. 






Table A2: Number of firms in the sample by headquarter country 
 
Country 
  Number of firms   
 With abnormal returns  With CDS spread changes  
Austria  20    
Belgium  36    
Bulgaria  3    
Croatia  6    
Cyprus  6    
Denmark  53  2  
Finland  100  5  
France  226  28  
Germany  205  16  
Greece  34    
Guernsey  2    
Hungary  8    
Iceland  9    
Ireland  45    
Isle of Man  4    
Italy  100  5  
Jersey  8    
Luxembourg  18    
Macedonia  2    
Malta  5    
Monaco  8    
Netherlands  63  9  
Norway  78    




Portugal  10    
Romania  5    
Russia  38    
Slovenia  3    
Spain  50  3  
Sweden  429  8  
Switzerland  109  7  
Ukraine  2    
United Kingdom   390   28   






Table A3: CDS spread changes and the PEPP in euro area and non-euro area countries 
 
The dependent variable is the change in the CDS spread observed on March 19, 2020. Investment grade (Non-investment grade) is a dummy variable indicating a 
long term, domestic or foreign, issuer credit rating of at least (lower than) BBB-/Baa3 issued by either Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. Leverage is liabilities divided by 
assets at the end of 2019. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of assets at the end of 2019. ROA is net income before extraordinary items divided by assets at 
the end of 2019. Book-to-market is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the end of 2019. Bonds/assets is the sum of the principal 
amounts of outstanding bonds divided by the book value of assets at the last reporting date in 2019. Regressions 1 to 4 (5 to 8) in Panel A include firms that are 
incorporated (headquartered) in the euro area. Regressions 1 to 4 (5 to 8) in Panel B include firms that are not incorporated (headquartered) in the euro area. In 
Panel B Non-investment grade is excluded because of insufficient variation in this variable. Regressions include country fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A   Incorporated in euro area   Headquartered in euro area   
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Investment grade  -8.695* -11.04  -5.060  -9.707* -12.34  -5.164  
  (4.411) (6.169)  (5.958)  (4.295) (6.314)  (6.036)  
Leverage  -14.14* -14.28* -13.16*** -19.72***  -19.99*** -20.23*** -13.71*** -20.18***  
  (5.882) (6.054) (3.189) (1.659)  (2.777) (2.533) (3.383) (1.566)  
Log assets  -0.0174 0.0864 -1.148 0.527  0.374 0.486 -0.729 0.803  
  (1.155) (1.162) (0.664) (1.203)  (1.150) (1.186) (0.969) (1.178)  
ROA  -19.84 -28.23 -20.80 -15.58  -33.76 -43.45 -20.56 -15.29  
  (26.46) (30.87) (30.12) (50.73)  (20.71) (24.97) (27.55) (49.58)  
Book-to-market  -7.435*** -7.755*** -6.687*** -9.112***  -8.739*** -9.121*** -6.637*** -9.133***  
  (1.497) (1.669) (1.339) (1.869)  (0.549) (1.136) (1.227) (1.882)  
Non-investment grade   -4.440  -7.179   -4.983  -7.261  
   (6.004)  (8.149)   (6.035)  (8.176)  
Bonds/assets    0.461 54.00    -1.063 54.11  
    (13.13) (66.63)    (13.59) (66.48)  
Bonds/assets * Investment grade     -61.90     -63.04  
     (66.51)     (65.97)  
Observations   67 67 64 64   66 66 65 65   
Adjusted R-squared  0.129 0.123 0.041 0.220  0.161 0.158 0.031 0.221  






Panel B   Incorporated in euro area    Headquartered in euro area   
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Investment grade  -4.548 -4.548  -7.212*  -2.717 -2.717  -2.275  
  (4.378) (4.378)  (2.266)  (2.840) (2.840)  (2.170)  
Leverage  -6.822 -6.822 -2.488 -7.724  -4.603 -4.603 0.668 -0.947  
  (6.504) (6.504) (6.760) (7.223)  (9.962) (9.962) (11.60) (13.28)  
Log assets  0.717 0.717 0.419 1.061*  0.525 0.525 0.340 0.592  
  (0.619) (0.619) (0.341) (0.401)  (0.517) (0.517) (0.358) (0.304)  
ROA  29.68** 29.68** 29.25** 26.11  33.34 33.34 33.11 32.50  
  (8.817) (8.817) (8.131) (12.35)  (17.42) (17.42) (18.66) (21.84)  
Book-to-market  -5.439 -5.439 -5.498 -7.545  -2.110 -2.110 -2.863 -3.592  
  (4.852) (4.852) (4.979) (5.377)  (6.093) (6.093) (6.830) (7.605)  
Bonds/assets    -13.23 -95.15**    -16.31 -72.72*  
    (6.925) (25.11)    (7.777) (30.27)  
Bonds/assets * Investment grade     84.80**     55.89  
     (22.63)     (24.53)  
Observations   42 42 41 41   45 45 43 43   
Adjusted R-squared  0.066 0.066 0.080 0.070  -0.078 -0.078 -0.027 -0.073  
Country FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes   
 
 
